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On October 27, 1997, circuit breakers caused the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to halt
trading for the first time in history as the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) lost 554 points.  The next
day, the NYSE traded a record 1.2 billion shares as the DJIA increased by 337 points, the largest single-
day point gain to date.  Using data on the limit order books and specialists’ quotes, we examine liquidity
provision by limit order traders and floor members during these extreme market movements.  We find
evidence that specialists fulfilled their obligations to ‘lean against the wind’ even though liquidity
provision by limit order traders declined precipitously.  An analysis of activity during the circuit breaker
reveals that limit order traders generally either remained inactive or withdrew liquidity during the market-
wide trading halt.1
Following declines in international equity markets, stock prices on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) declined precipitously on Monday, October 27, 1997.  By 2:36 PM, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (DJIA) had lost 350 points from the previous day’s close.  This decline caused the “circuit
breaker” provision of NYSE Rule 80B to be triggered for the first time since the rule was adopted in late
1988, resulting in a half hour market-wide trading halt.  Trading resumed at 3:06 PM, but the market
continued to fall.  By 3:36 PM, the DJIA fell another 200 points, once again triggering Rule 80B, thus
shutting the market for the remainder of the day.  This 554-point drop in the DJIA on October 27
th marked
the largest single-day point drop to date.
On the following day, Tuesday, October 28, 1997, the DJIA regained 337 points, the largest
single-day point increase up to that time.  In addition, trading volume on the NYSE soared to a record 1.2
billion shares, almost doubling its previous record of 684 million shares set on January 23, 1997.
1
Monday, October 27
th and Tuesday, October 28
th marked the most turbulent two-day period in the
market in over a decade.  Such extreme market movements could be due to the market's rapid readjustment
of expectations of underlying fundamental variables.  Alternatively, these extreme movements could be
due to failures in the usual liquidity provision process.  In either case, examining liquidity provision during
extreme market movements is particularly important for a number of reasons.  First, market rules and
regulations are designed to assist in liquidity provision precisely during such times of extreme market
movements.  Second, little is known about the workings of markets – or the strategies of liquidity providers
– during extreme market movements since most theoretical models of trading do not account for trading
behavior under these circumstances.  Third, due to a lack of data, empirical research on previous stock
market breaks has been confined to studying price and volume data across stock, futures and options
                                                     
1 Moreover, each of the trading days between Thursday, October 23, 1997 and Thursday, October 30, 1997 rank in
the top 10 busiest NYSE trading days.2
markets.
2  Finally, despite the existence of market-wide trading restrictions since late 1988, the October
1997 market break provides the first opportunity to analyze the performance of a systematic, market-wide
trading halt on U.S. equity markets.
During periods of extreme market movements, the provision of liquidity and its management
through market-wide regulation are of paramount concern for both market participants and regulators. 
Since by their very nature extreme market movements are quite rare, one cannot hope to create a
statistically significant sample of "extreme" market movements.  As such, we examine the most recent
example, both to analyze the effect of the first-ever execution of market-wide circuit breakers and to
control for the many market- and economy-wide changes that have occurred since 1987 and 1929.
We therefore examine liquidity provision surrounding the October 1997 market break with three
goals in mind.  The first goal is to understand how liquidity providers react during extreme movements, in
particular, their strategic choices, including the extent and nature of their supply of liquidity, or whether
they exit the market altogether.  The second goal is to compare the actions of limit order traders and floor
members in order to highlight differences in liquidity providers’ actions.  The third goal is to investigate
how liquidity providers react to market-wide trading halts.
In order to examine these issues, we investigate the behavior of liquidity providers (floor members
as well as limit order traders) by estimating the relative contributions to liquidity provision by each group. 
We use data on the quoted spread and quoted depth as well as data on the limit order book spread, depth
and composition to ascertain how liquidity providers react to high degrees of adverse selection risk and
price uncertainty.  We separately examine floor member behavior, since, unlike limit order traders, some
members of the floor – specialists – are required to maintain a presence in the market while simultaneously
                                                     
2 For example, Kleidon (1988), Blume, MacKinlay and Terker (1989), Harris (1989) and Bertero and Mayer (1990).
For an overview of the issues concerning financial markets during extreme market movements as well as a summary
of the official government reports concerning the 1987 market break, see Kamphuis, Kormendi and Watson (1989),
Litan and Santomero (1998) and Stoll (1998).3
maintaining narrow bid-ask spreads, reasonable market depth, and price continuity.  At issue is how well
these functions are performed in the market’s time of liquidity need.
In addition to investigating liquidity provision, we take the unique opportunity to examine the
impact of the first implementation of the market-wide circuit breakers since their inception.  There has
been much debate about the advisability of closing the market temporarily during extremely volatile
periods.
3  Some, such as Kyle (1988), Greenwald and Stein (1988, 1991), Kodres and O’Brien (1994), and
Brady (1998) argue that a temporary closure allows liquidity providers, particularly buyers, time to reenter
the market to absorb a further decline.  In addition, they argue the break provides time for market
participants to ‘catch-up mentally’.  Others, such as, Coursey and Dyl (1990), Grossman (1990) and
Subrahmanyam (1994, 1995) suggest that a temporary market closure at best postpones market activity
until trading can again generate information and, at worst, exacerbates the problem by inducing traders to
exit the market before it closes.  We examine order flow surrounding the circuit breaker in order to
understand how liquidity providers reacted to the closure in order to bring some evidence to bear on the
circuit breaker debate. 
Our results show that a substantial liquidity drain occurs not on the day of the market break
(Monday, October 27, 1997) but rather on the following day (Tuesday, October 28, 1997) as limit order
traders are reluctant to replace expired day limit orders.  The liquidity drain is characterized by
significantly wider limit order book spreads as well as significantly diminished depth throughout the limit
order book.  Specialists, with the aid of floor brokers, performed their function as liquidity providers of last
resort by maintaining narrow spreads and normal depth, despite the significantly diminished liquidity
provision by the limit order traders.  The analysis of the order flow activity reveals that limit order traders
adjust their behavior to the extreme circumstance by repositioning their orders to account for large price
changes in the posted quotes.  In particular, both buy and sell limit orders are repositioned at lower limit
                                                     
3 See Harris (1998) for an overview of the circuit breaker debate.4
prices as the market falls -- the buy orders “running away” from the market and the sell orders “chasing”
the market.
Market activity leading up to the circuit breaker displays some characteristics consistent with a
‘magnet effect’ (an increased demand for sellside immediacy) in that market sell orders become more
numerous and larger on average and limit buy orders are cancelled with greater intensity.  However, these
effects are difficult to distinguish from a simple increase in trading activity associated with a large
downward movement in prices.  Furthermore, market activity during the circuit breaker reveals that more
market participants took the opportunity to cancel limit orders than to place new orders, although the
orders cancelled were much further away from the quotes than the orders placed.  The consequence of
these actions was decreased depth on the limit order book – especially for limit order prices further from
the quotes – from the time the circuit breaker was lifted until the end of trading.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the data, time period
investigated, and procedure used in constructing the estimates of the limit order books.  Section II provides
summary statistics for the market break period.  Section III details the behavior of the liquidity providers
during this time period.  Section IV investigates the impact of the circuit breakers on the market and
Section V concludes.
I. Data and Methodology
We use order data and quote data provided by the NYSE to conduct our analysis.
4  The order data
consists of order placement records as well as execution and cancellation records placed through the
SuperDOT system.  The quote data is made up of prices and depths posted by NYSE specialists.  The
stock sample was generated from the 100 surviving common stocks of the Trades, Orders, Reports and
                                                     
4 We thank the NYSE for providing the data for this study.5
Quotes (TORQ) database at the time the data was collected, November 1997.
5  While slightly over-
weighted towards larger stocks, these 100 stocks are reasonably well distributed across the stocks on the
NYSE in terms of market capitalization.
We define the period surrounding the October 1997 market break as Friday, October 24, 1997 to
Wednesday, October 29, 1997.  We also construct two control periods prior to the event, although our
choice of control periods was constrained in two ways.  First, since the NYSE reduced its minimum tick
size on June 24, 1997, periods before and shortly after the tick size change would be inappropriate for use
as control periods due to the shift in liquidity provision described in Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000). 
Second, periods close to the October market break are also inappropriate for use as control periods as they
may potentially display some preliminary effects of the market break.  To minimize these confounding
effects in our control sample, we use July 18 – 23, 1997 as the first control period and September 12 – 17,
1997 as the second control period.  Both control periods and the market break period begin at 12:00 noon
on Friday and end at the close the following Wednesday to reduce any day-of-the-week effects.
Data from each of the three periods are used to construct limit order book estimates using the
technique described in Kavajecz (1999).  The principle behind the limit order book estimation is that at
any instant in time, the limit order book should reflect those orders remaining after the orders placed prior
to the time in question are netted with all prior execution and cancellation records.  Th first step involved
in estimating the limit order book at a particular point in time is estimating the limit order book at the
beginning of the period.  We use data from March 1997 through November 1997 to search for all records
that have order arrival dates prior to the period in question.  We use the good-’til-cancelled limit orders to
form an estimate of the initial limit order book (or "prebook") at the start of the period.
After the prebook is constructed, current records in the database are processed.  To estimate the
                                                     
5 The TORQ database is a stratified sample of 144 stocks and contains all trades that took place, all orders that were
placed through one of the automated routing systems, a detailed report on the listing of counter parties and the
specialist’s quotes.  For more information about the TORQ database see Hasbrouck (1991).6
limit order book for a given date and time, all records with a date and time stamp prior to the chosen date
and time are selected and separated into their respective categories:  orders, executions and cancellations.
New orders are added to the prebook and execution and cancellation records are matched to existing orders
on the limit order book, where matched orders are eliminated.  The remainder, the set of orders or residual
orders that were not executed or cancelled, becomes our estimate of the limit order book for the chosen
date and time.
We create a sequence of “snapshots” of the limit order book by sequentially updating the limit
order book estimates.  Limit order books are estimated at thirty-minute intervals on the half-hour; however,
there are two exceptions to this rule.  The first exception is the initial limit order book estimates of each
day, which is calculated at the time of each stock’s opening quote.  The second exceptions are the
estimates at 2:30 PM, 3:00 PM and 3:30 PM on October 27, 1997 that are instead calculated at 2:36 PM
(the initiation of the first circuit breaker), 3:06 PM (the end of the first circuit breaker) and 3:40 PM (just
after the halting of the market for the day) to coincide with the market-wide trading halts.  The result is a
sequence of limit order books “snapshots” comprised of approximately 50 observations in each of the three
periods for each of the 100 stocks in the sample.  Results are equally-weighted averages across these thirty
minute snapshots.
II. Trading during the Market Break Period and the Demand for Liquidity
In order to examine the behavior of liquidity providers during this period, it is important to
understand both the timing of events and the demands placed upon liquidity providers.  A brief chronology
of events surrounding the October 1997 market break can be found in Table 1.  In addition, Chart 1
displays the minute-by-minute DJIA over the market break period.  Table 1 highlights the timing of the
implementation of the various trading restrictions, while Chart 1 demonstrates the impact of these7
restrictions, as well as the impact of trading pressures, on the DJIA.
6  Together, Table 1 and Chart 1
provide evidence of the turbulent nature of the period in question.
Table 2 provides statistics on the demand for liquidity by analyzing SuperDOT market orders
submitted over this period.  Panel A of Table 2 provides data on the event period while Panel B provides
data on the control periods.  For both Panels A and B, the day is broken up into three two-hour periods:
morning (10:00:00 AM to 11:59:59 AM), midday (12:00:00 Noon to 1:59:59 PM) and afternoon (2:00:00
PM to 4:00:00 PM).  In addition, Monday afternoon, in both the market event period and the control
period, is further subdivided to map into the time periods surrounding the two market-wide trading halts: a
pre-period from 2:00 PM to the execution of the trading halt at 2:36 PM, the period of the first market-
wide trading halt from 2:36 PM to 3:06 PM, and the resumption of trading period from 3:06 PM to 3:36
PM.  At 3:36 PM, the circuit breaker was triggered for the second time and trading ceased for the
remainder of the day.
Table 2 displays the numbers of market orders submitted, the average order size, as well as the
bid-ask spread and relevant depth quote at the time the order was submitted, broken down by buy and sell
orders.  The results in Table 2 show that the quoted bid-ask spread is significantly higher over the entire
three day period with both buy and sell market orders being placed during periods of increased quoted bid-
ask spreads.  In addition, the quoted bid depth is significantly smaller than the quoted bid depth in the
control periods, while the quoted ask depth is significantly smaller during Friday and Wednesday
afternoons and is significantly larger from the implementation of the first circuit breaker through the close
of trading on Tuesday.  These results suggest that market sell orders faced less liquidity overall compared
to market buy orders throughout the entire break period. 
The aggressiveness of liquidity demanded is revealed through the number and size of the market
orders submitted over this period.  Friday and Wednesday are characterized by heavy liquidity demand on
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both the buy and sell sides of the market.  Monday is characterized by an increased number of larger than
average sell orders, while on Tuesday, the number of buy orders is substantially above the control group's
number of buy orders and dwarfs the number of sell orders.  However, the average size of these buy orders
is less than half the average size of the control group. It is puzzling that market participants who wished to
purchase shares aggressively by submitting market orders in the face of large bid-ask spreads chose only to
transact a small number of shares when far more were available.  One possibility is that retail customers,
who cannot purchase large number of shares, bought most of the shares on Tuesday.
In summary, the heightened activity during the market break period was characterized by
aggressive liquidity demand with both buy and sell market orders being submitted in the face of larger than
average spreads.  In general, selling pressure (characterized by large sell orders) dominated Monday’s
activity as well as the final hours of trading each day, while buying pressure (characterized by many small
buy orders) dominated Tuesday’s activity.  The effect of these and other market wide pressures for
liquidity sent the DJIA falling on Monday and rebounding on Tuesday.
III. Liquidity Providers
Given the demand pressures on Monday and Tuesday, we need to analyze the relative
contributions to liquidity provision by limit order traders and floor members.  Our focus is to identify
whether specific aspects of the liquidity provider’s behavior impacts, or is impacted by, activity during
these extreme circumstances.  By comparing the sequence of order and quote data surrounding the October
1997 market break with the sequence of order and quote data during the control periods, we analyze the
level and nature of liquidity provided, and the dynamic changes in strategy made by traders in this
turbulent market.9
A. Limit Order Traders
Limit order traders are faced with many risks when supplying liquidity: the risk that they trade
with someone possessing superior information, the risk that the specialist passes on undesirable order flow,
and the risk associated with price uncertainty.  During periods of extreme market movements these risks
are heightened.  As a result, limit order traders may strategically choose to reduce liquidity, either by
shifting depth away from the quotes or reducing the depth provided at a given price.  In fact, it is possible
that limit order traders may no longer be willing to supply any depth at certain prices, even if they were
willing to do so previously.  Indeed, in the face of this turbulent market, some traders may strategically
move their orders from the limit order book to the floor, and may in fact become liquidity demanders
instead of liquidity suppliers.
We investigate liquidity provision by the limit order book in two ways.  First, we analyze the limit
order book spread, i.e., the spread between the best buyside and sellside limit order prices, and the
cumulative depth – i.e., the sum of all shares available at a particular price or better on the limit order book
– at successively distant prices.
7  Second, we investigate the characteristics of the flow of limit orders over
these periods.  Specifically, we follow the number of limit orders placed, whether they were eventually,
executed, canceled, expired or still active, the size of those orders, and where on the limit order book they
were positioned. 
Chart 2 provides snapshots of the limit order book at 1:00 PM on Friday (October 24
th), Monday
(October 27
th), Tuesday (October 28
th) and Wednesday (October 29
th).  The data were calculated by
averaging the cumulative depths across the sample stocks in increments of sixteenths as far away as two
                                                     
7 More specifically, cumulative depth on the buy side is measured from the highest limit order on the buy (bid) side
of the limit order book, while cumulative depth on the sell side is measured from the lowest sell limit order price on
the sell (ask) side of the limit order book.  Note that this definition is different than if measured from the midpoint of
the bid-ask spread or from the quoted bid and quoted ask respectively. As we will see later, the best buy or sell price
on the limit order book retreated quite far from the specialists' quotes.  Thus, our definition of cumulative depth is
quite conservative as it measures only changes in the limit order book itself, and not the relation between the limit
order and the specialists' quotes.10
dollars from the best buyside and sellside limit prices.  These averages are then placed the appropriate
dollar distance from the average best buyside and sellside limit prices.  The right (left) side of Chart 2
indicates the average cumulative depth of sell (buy) limit orders. The average limit order book spread is the
range of prices over which the cumulative depth is zero.  The sloped lines on each side of the limit order
book spread represents the cumulative depth on the sellside (buyside) as limit prices rise (fall). 
Consequently, Chart 2 displays the average demand (buyside) and supply (sellside) schedules for shares of
stock in our sample.
As indicated by Chart 2, limit order books on Monday, October 27
th did not indicate any
significant decrease in liquidity as of 1:00 PM with bid-ask spreads and depth levels remaining relatively
unchanged.  In fact, the cumulative depths on the limit order books on both Friday, October 24
th and
Monday, October 27
th at 1:00 PM were not significantly different from the cumulative depths of the two
control periods at that time.  In contrast, the 1:00 PM limit order books on Tuesday, October 28
th, the day
after the significant market drop, are significantly different from the limit order books in the control period
at the 5% level.  Most striking is the large range of prices – from $36 3/8 to $39 5/8 – on Tuesday, October
28
th where there were no limit orders, either to buy or to sell.  Indeed, Monday’s range of $38 13/16 to
$39¼ is subsumed completely in Tuesday’s range, indicating that limit orders were much less willing to
provide liquidity on the day after the market drop than they were on the day of the drop itself.
Chart 3 provides a more comprehensive view of the time series of average cumulative depth for
both the buyside and sellside of the market.  The chart displays the time series of half-hour cumulative
limit order book depth observations between Friday, October 24, 1997 at noon to Wednesday, October 29,
1997 at 4:00 PM.  The data for Chart 3 are calculated in the same manner as Chart 2; however, Chart 3
cumulates the series of half-hour cumulative depth charts across time.   (Chart 2 merely contains the
cutouts for 1:00 PM from Chart 3).  Therefore, the right (left) side of Chart 3 indicates the average
cumulative depth of sell (buy) limit orders. The average limit order book spread is the range of prices over11
which the cumulative depth is zero, which creates the floor of the valley in the center.  The rising cliffs on
each side represent the cumulative depth on the buyside (sellside) as limit prices rise (fall).  Consequently,
Chart 3 displays the time series of average demand (buyside) and supply (sellside) schedules for stocks in
our sample.  In addition, Table 3 is included to accompany Chart 3 by providing limit order book spread
and cumulative depth values and significance information for select time periods.
Chart 3 and Table 3 reveal that the limit order book spreads over the three days vary dramatically. 
 The average limit order book spreads on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday were $0.75, $2.90, and $0.57
respectively.  While the values on Monday and Wednesday are not significantly different from the limit
order book spreads of the control sample, the values for Tuesday are significantly different from the control
sample at the 5% level throughout the entire day.  The pattern of cumulative depth on the limit order book
as shown in Chart 3 and Table 3 is also revealing during this time.  There is a distinct drop in cumulative
depth from Friday’s close to Monday’s open.  Despite this drop and the steadily declining market
throughout Monday, the level of cumulative depth remains statistically in a normal range until the end of
the initial trading halt.
Cumulative depths during the last half-hour of trading on Monday and throughout Tuesday were
statistically lower than the control sample for limit prices an eighth or more away from the best buyside
price and a quarter or more away from the best sellside price.  Surprisingly, the depths at the best buyside
and sellside limit prices are in general not statistically different from the depths in the control sample, even
though 17 limit order books estimates were empty on the buyside at some point on Monday or Tuesday,
while the control samples only had four cases.  Although the limit order book spread reverts to a normal
range on Wednesday, the diminished cumulative depth shown on Tuesday continues.  Although not
shown, cumulative depths on Wednesday afternoon are statistically smaller than the control sample for12
limit prices an eighth away from the best buyside price and within an eighth of the best sellside price.
8
The absence of a statistical difference in both Monday’s limit order book spread and cumulative
depth series versus the control sample suggests that, in general, limit order traders maintained their normal
level of liquidity provision until the market-wide trading halt.  In contrast, Tuesday displays an extreme
liquidity drain, as the limit order book spread is significantly larger and cumulative depth series
significantly smaller than the corresponding series in the control sample.  Wednesday shows some signs of
recovery as the limit order book spread returns to normal levels; however, the lower cumulative depth
persists.  Overall the behavior of the limit order books surrounding the market break reveals that
surprisingly, the liquidity drain surrounding this market break occurs not on the day of the drop but rather
on the subsequent days after there had been a market closure. 
Liquidity providers’ response of reducing liquidity provision during times of excessive price
uncertainty and adverse selection risk is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Rock (1990) and
Seppi (1997), as well as the empirical findings of Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), Bremer, Hiraki and
Sweeney (1997), Chung, Van Ness and Van Ness (1999) and Kavajecz (1999).  As Tuesday's results
clearly indicate, limit order traders respond to extreme volatility by providing fewer shares and by placing
those shares at less aggressive prices.  An interesting puzzle, however, is that this predicted behavior
happened on Tuesday after the extreme market movement, rather than on Monday.  These results suggest
that adverse selection costs are extremely high after a day of extreme market movements or potentially
after a market closure.
One reason for this result is the expiration of day limit orders on Monday that were never replaced
on Tuesday morning, as shown in Chart 3 and Table 3 by the widened limit order book spread and sharp
drop in depth at the open on Tuesday.  Limit order traders were perfectly capable of replacing their expired
                                                     
8 The aggregate results of a wide limit order book spread on Tuesday accompanied by diminished depth on Tuesday
and Wednesday holds uniformly across the individual stocks in the sample.  Even stocks as liquid and frequently
traded as Boeing, IBM, Phillip Morris and AT&T, display these results. 13
limit orders had they wished to do so, yet they chose not to provide liquidity the following day.  A
complicating factor in this analysis is the first-ever implementation of the circuit breaker and the potential
for further halts.  Given the limitations in the data, we cannot determine whether the reaction of limit order
traders are common to all market breaks or whether their reaction was a response to the potential for
further market-wide trading halts on Tuesday. 
Table 3 and Charts 2 and 3 allow us to analyze liquidity at a particular moment in time. Although
this static analysis of limit order books displays the levels of the bid-ask spread and levels of various depth
figures, it does not capture the speed at which liquidity is entering and leaving the market.  While an asset
may have a wide bid-ask spread and/or diminished cumulative depth at a particular moment in time,
equally important is the potential for rapid replacement of executed orders which may result in a large flow
of liquidity provision over time.  Since the rate at which limit orders are placed, executed and cancelled
impacts the overall flow of liquidity in a market, we analyze the flow of SuperDOT limit orders to
investigate how limit order traders collectively manage their limit orders over this time period.
To examine the order management decisions of limit order traders, Tables 4 and 5 provide data on
the order flow characteristics of limit orders for the buy and sell sides of the market respectively.  In
particular, Tables 4 and 5 provide information on the number of orders placed, their average size, and the
dispersion of the order at the time of submission.  Buyside (Sellside) dispersion is defined as the dollar
difference between the limit price of the order and the quoted bid (ask) at the time.
9  In addition, the
average size of executed limit orders as well as the average size and dispersion of cancelled limit orders is
shown.  Panel A displays the results for the event period while Panel B shows the results for the control
                                                     
9 Note that this definition does not take into account any changes in the bid-ask spread and thus focuses only on the
aggressiveness of limit orders relative to the quoted price on that side of the market.  By defining dispersion relative
to the same side quote, rather than relative to the bid-ask midpoint, we do not capture the increase in the bid-ask
spread as shown in Table 2.  Thus, our definition of dispersion is conservative as it is biased against finding a
statistically significant change during the market event period.14
periods.
Table 4 shows the behavior of buyside order flow.  Prior to the triggering of the first circuit
breaker on Monday, the number of buy limit orders placed exceeds the number submitted in the control
periods.  The average size of buyside limit orders was in general in line with the control periods for most of
the market break period; however, buy orders were statistically larger the half- hour prior to the initial
market wide trading halt and on Tuesday morning.  In contrast, buy orders were statistically smaller during
the first market wide trading halt.  Although the market was "halted", specialists were still accepting orders
since the market was not "closed".  It is possible that the low number of orders placed during the halt could
be due to few market participants understanding this distinction.
The dispersion calculations indicate that the locus of placement for buy orders on Friday and on
Monday morning was almost identical to that of the control group.  The buy limit orders, submitted
surrounding the trading halts on Monday and on Tuesday and Wednesday mornings, were generally placed
farther from the quoted bid.  These results suggest that buyside limit order traders were supplying liquidity
at crucial times during the markets fall, but protected themselves somewhat by becoming less aggressive. 
One potential explanation for this behavior is that traders wishing to buy, who would otherwise demand
immediacy by submitting market orders, switched to using limit orders placed slightly behind the bid.  In a
falling market, this strategy maintains its high probability of immediacy but also generates a profit, relative
to a market order, for the provision of liquidity.
The pattern of executed buy limit orders suggests that the buy limit orders took on more of the
selling pressure on Tuesday, given that statistically more buy limit orders shares executed, and less on
Wednesday, given statistically fewer buy limit orders shares executed.  In general, larger orders on average
were cancelled both Monday and Tuesday, except for the half-hour of the circuit breaker.  While in general
the dispersion of these cancelled orders was not significantly different than the control group, the orders
that were cancelled, from the initiation of the first circuit breaker on Monday through Tuesday morning,15
were on average farther away from the bid than usual.  Thus at least some buy limit orders took the
opportunity to flee as the market fell, although those that did so were not close to the quoted bid at the time
they were cancelled.
Although the amount of buy orders cancelled was not unusually large during the half-hour of the
circuit breaker, the amount placed was unusually small, resulting in a net loss of liquidity.  Despite the net
loss, the dispersion characteristics indicate that during the half-hour of the circuit breaker, buy orders were
cancelled far away from the quote while new orders were positioned much closer to the quote.  This shift
in the cumulative depth closer to the quoted bid could help support prices after the market re-opened, but
did not provide liquidity at still lower prices.
In summary, Table 4 shows that buyside limit order traders were actively managing their exposure
over the market break period by not only adjusting the size of their orders but also managing the relative
distance to the quoted bid price.   Over the initial halt period, there was a net reduction of liquidity,
although some of the orders cancelled were farther away from the current price than the new ones that were
submitted.  Therefore, buyside limit order traders dynamically and strategically altered their liquidity
provision over this turbulent period.
Table 5 shows the same information for sell limit order flow.  As in the case of the buy limit
orders, there are more sell orders submitted relative to the control in almost every period, although notable
exceptions are the half-hour of the initial market wide trading halt and part of Tuesday.  In general,
submitted sell limit orders are larger on average over the market break period, particularly during the initial
hours of trading each day.  This result coincides with the larger than average executed sell limit orders that
occur during the initial hours of trading each day.  Thus, these results suggest that submissions of sell limit
orders tend to be concentrated in the most active trading periods. 
The dispersion of placed sell limit orders shows that in general, sell limit orders were placed
statistically closer to the ask than submissions in the control periods, from late Friday afternoon through16
noon Tuesday except for the initial market halt.  In particular, sell orders were extremely aggressive for the
half-hour between the first market halt and the second.  In fact, they were placed in front of the ask,
resulting in a negative dispersion.  This aggressive placement strategy could be due to the high level of
competition among sellside liquidity providers to supply liquidity to the few buyers present in the market. 
In contrast, the dispersion of the cancelled sell limit orders reveals that the sell limit orders being cancelled
on Monday are statistically farther from the ask than in the control period.  Furthermore, in comparing the
dispersions of placed and cancelled sell limit orders over this period, the results show that in aggregate, sell
limit orders are cancelled when they are far from the ask and placed close to the quoted ask price.  Thus,
after placing a sell limit order, traders find their sell order far from the market as the quoted ask falls; to
adjust, traders cancel their order and reposition it closer to the market. 
In summary, liquidity providers continuously placed, canceled and repositioned their orders
throughout the day to adjust to the decline in quoted prices.  Upon being placed, a buy limit order was
chased by the quoted prices, while a sell limit order chased the quoted prices.
A.  Floor Members
As liquidity providers, floor members (specialists and floor brokers) also have an incentive to
decrease the amount of liquidity they provide to the market during extreme market movements.  Unlike
floor brokers who need not maintain a presence in the market, specialists have an overriding fiduciary
responsibility to maintain a presence in the market despite the difficult trading circumstances.  Specifically,
specialists are charged with maintaining a ‘fair and orderly’ market, and are bound by a number of
exchange mandated requirements.  Price continuity, a narrow bid-ask spread, and reasonable quoted depth
are just a few of the elements of these requirements. Because it is precisely in times of excessive volatility
or extreme market movements when specialists, as liquidity providers, are most wanted, the question of
how they behave during these circumstances is paramount.  Unfortunately, we cannot partition the17
behavior of the specialist and floor brokers because having only data on quoted prices and depths and the
SuperDOT limit orders does not allow us to differentiate between specialists adding liquidity for their own
account and specialists reflecting the interest of floor brokers within the quotes.
10  Despite this data
limitation, the analysis to follow investigates whether specialists, with the potential aid of floor brokers,
fulfill their obligation as liquidity providers of last resort.  Alternatively, the analysis can be thought of as
the benefit of having a floor-based trading mechanism during extreme trading circumstances.
Chart 4 provides a comparison of the average quoted spread and the average limit order book
spread.  The vertical bars represent the average quoted spread (centered on the average bid-ask spread
midpoint) and the vertical lines represent the average limit order book spread (centered on the average
limit order book spread midpoint).  A striking feature of the chart is the dramatic increase in the limit order
book spread on Tuesday as was seen in Charts 2 and 3.  In stark contrast to the limit order spread, the
quoted spread remained relatively constant over this period, averaging $0.22, $0.25 and $0.25 for Monday,
Tuesday and Wednesday respectively.  Furthermore, unlike the limit order spreads, the quoted spreads over
these three days were not significantly different from the quoted spread in the control sample.
11
Further evidence concerning the liquidity provision of floor members can be seen in Table 6 which
shows the relative contribution to liquidity by the floor members (specialists and floor brokers) and the
limit order book.  Columns 1 and 4 display the percentage of time within the sample that floor members
are contributing to liquidity by either providing additional depth beyond that supplied by the limit order
book or bettering the best limit order book price.  Columns 2 and 5 display the average level of depth
contribution by floor members at the best available prices, while columns 3 and 6 display the average level
of depth contribution of limit orders at the best available prices.
                                                     
10 For an analysis of floor brokers actions see Sofianos and Werner (1997).
11 The quoted depth figures, however, did show somewhat lower levels as there were intermittent periods of
statistically lower quoted depth on both the buyside and sellside throughout Tuesday and Wednesday.18
Table 6 shows that floor members were particularly crucial in providing liquidity during periods of
extreme market stress.  Floor members provided liquidity beyond the limit order book significantly more
frequently during the extreme stress periods of Monday afternoon and all day Tuesday.  Moreover, they
also provided statistically more shares on the buyside at the low point of the market Tuesday morning and
the close Tuesday afternoon.  Consistent with the data in Chart 2 and 3, Table 6 also shows that the depth
contributed by the limit order book was statistically smaller than the depth in the control sample.
The results on floor member liquidity provision suggest that specialists, with the potential aid of
floor brokers, performed their functions of ‘leaning against the wind’ well.  Floor members not only
maintained a market presence, but also preserved normal quoted bid-ask spread while filling in gaps in the
limit order book depth.  In particular, during moments of extreme stress, floor members provided
significant liquidity to the market at the exact times when limit order traders stepped away from the market
and were unwilling to indicate publicly their willingness to provide liquidity via standing limit orders. 
Thus, either specialists performed their job of maintaining fair and orderly markets, or limit orders shifted
to the floor, or both.
The results in Table 6 and in Chart 4 may also help explain the next day "bounce back" that is a
feature of almost all significant one day declines.
12  One factor that may contribute to the "bounce back" is
the relative size and position of the quoted and limit order book spreads.  When limit order book spreads
are extremely wide and specialists’ quotes are positioned in the lowest portion of the limit order book
spread, specialists are aided by the remaining buyside limit orders while they are unaided by sellside limit
orders.  Thus, once liquidity demanders start to buy shares, the limit order book provides little resistance
against a sharp increase in prices.  In particular, the buyside of the limit order book provides some added
support against further price declines while the sellside of the limit order book is too distant to be of any
                                                     
12 For example, this pattern has occurred in the market breaks of 1929, 1987, and 1997.19
immediate use to the specialist.
13  As shown in SEC (1998), once the market reversed itself on Tuesday
morning, the increase in prices was quite rapid and far outpaced the speed of the downturn during any time
on Monday.
Furthermore, work by Kavajecz and Odders-White (1999) shows that specialists’ reactions are
stronger to order flow in the absence of a limit order book than in the presence of a limit order book. 
Therefore, the specialist is likely to increase prices more in response to buy orders than he is likely to
decrease prices in response to sell orders.  Thus, while the limit order liquidity provision results of Table 6
and Chart 4 cannot explain Monday's decline, they may help explain Tuesday's record-breaking rise.
IV. Market-wide Trading Restrictions
After the market break of 1987, there were a number of official government reports that analyzed
what took place, what went wrong, and what could be done to prevent market breaks in the future.
14  Much
of the analysis focused on market-wide trading restrictions aimed at decreasing volatility in the market. 
These trading restrictions took many forms: margin requirements, program trading restrictions, price limits
and coordinated market-wide trading halts.  In this section, we turn our attention from the behavior of
liquidity providers over the entire four day period to an analysis of the impact of the market-wide trading
restriction, known as NYSE Rule 80B, more commonly known as circuit breakers.
15  Specifically, Rule
80B requires that there be a period in which trading is halted whenever the DJIA declines by a
predetermined amount within a single trading day.  At the time of the 1997 market break, Rule 80B stated
                                                     
13 Similarly, floor brokers with sell orders receive liquidity from the remaining buyside limit orders.  However, floor
brokers with buy orders do not receive benefit from even the best sellside limit orders, since the best sellside limit
orders may be as far away as $3 from the current prices, as shown in Chart 4.
14The official government reports concerning the 1987 market break include:  Financial Markets: Preliminary
Observations on the October 1987 Crash, The October 1987 Market Break: A Report by the Division of Market
Regulation U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and Report of The Presidential Task Force on Market
Mechanisms. 
15 For an analysis of the other types of trading restrictions see, Kupiec (1997) for margin requirements, Kuserk,
Locke and Sayers (1992) for program trading restrictions and McMillan (1991) for price limits.20
that a 350 (500) point drop in the DJIA would trigger a market-wide trading halt of 30 (60) minutes. 
Subsequently, Rule 80B has been redefined to require a 10% (20%) drop in the DJIA based on the
previous quarter’s average of closing prices.  A 30% drop will now close the market for the remainder of
the day.
Since the October 1987 crash, the debate continues on the cost and benefits of circuit breakers.
16 
Some argue that circuit breakers allow the market to somehow ‘catch-up’, or at least catch their breath,
while others suggest that circuit breakers do nothing more than prevent consenting adults from trading. 
Since Rule 80B had never been triggered prior to October 1997, examining the effectiveness and
performance of circuit breakers has been difficult.  Some, such as Greenwald and Stein (1991), Kodres and
O’Brien (1994), and Subrahmanyam (1994), rely on theoretical models to examine circuit breakers, while
others, such as Courney and Dyl (1990) and Ackert, Church, and Jayaraman (1999) use experimental
techniques.  Greenwald and Stein (1991) and Kodres and O’Brien (1994) each develop a model that
indicates that properly designed circuit breakers may mitigate uncertainty by reducing transactional risk
and therefore, help the market achieve optimal outcomes.  In contrast, Courney and Dyl (1990),
Subrahmanyam (1994) and Ackert, Church and Jayaraman (1999) argue that the existence of circuit
breakers may have the perverse effect of increasing price volatility prior to the triggering due to the
‘magnet effect’.  The magnet hypothesis suggests that market participants, fearing the inability to trade
when the market is halted, will alter their trading strategies in order to exit their long positions before the
market halts.  The rush of market participants closing their positions quickly would then actually
exacerbate the problem by pressing the price closer to the circuit breaker trigger level.   
Others have empirically examined the effectiveness of circuit breakers on foreign markets.  For
example, Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993) examine the effects of trading halts on the Tel Aviv Stock
market during the October 1987 crash, finding that the circuit breakers helped reduce price losses the
                                                     
16 For example, see Cochrane (1998) and Lucchetti and Ip (1998).21
following day but had little long-term effect.  In addition, Bertero and Mayer (1990) examine the effects of
market structure, including circuit breakers, on stock market performance on 23 markets around the world
during the October 1987 crash.
17
In a related literature, researchers such as Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994), Edelen and Gervais
(1997) and Corwin and Lipson (1999) have investigated the effect of halting trade on individual stocks. 
Individual halts, although somewhat different from market-wide trading halts due to the discretionary
nature of their implementation, can be informative about how liquidity providers react to trading
restrictions.  Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) argues that individual trading halts increase, rather than
decrease, both volume and volatility.  They conclude that individual trading halts do not facilitate the
transmission of information to market participants as proponents argue.  In contrast, Edelen and Gervais
(1997) model individual trading halts in a principle-agent framework and argue that halts are beneficial to
exchanges in that they facilitate the monitoring of specialists’ actions in order to curb potentially abusive
pricing behavior.  In closely related work, Corwin and Lipson (1999) show that limit order traders are
reluctant to supply liquidity during unusual trading periods resulting in diminished limit order book depth
and active repositioning of their orders.
We investigate the first implementation of the circuit breakers on Monday, October 27, 1997.  Our
analysis is done from the perspective of liquidity providers and its focus is on bringing evidence to bear on
two issues.  First, we investigate whether the circuit breaker trigger mechanism creates the magnet effect
hypothesized by Subrahmanyam (1994).  We analyze the flow of orders during three half-hour periods in
order to investigate whether market participants moved quickly to exit the market.  Second, we investigate
how liquidity providers reacted during and after the market wide trading halt.  On one hand, if circuit
breakers allow liquidity providers the time to ‘catch-up,’ the market will be stabilized.  On the other hand,
if circuit breakers induce liquidity providers to cancel limit orders because of a lack of information they
                                                     
17For an overview and discussion of research on circuit breakers see Harris (1998).22
will have a destabilizing effect.
A. The Magnet Effect
Under the magnet effect hypothesis, market participants should have an increasing demand for
liquidity on the buyside of the market as prices approach the halt trigger level.  The magnet effect could
manifest itself in a number of ways.  First, market sell orders should be submitted at an increasing rate and
increasing sizes as the trigger approaches.  Second, limit order traders wishing to sell may decide to cancel
their limit sell orders and replace them with market sell orders, choosing to exchange trading profits for
immediacy.  Third, limit order traders wishing to buy shares may decide to cancel or reposition their limit
orders in anticipation of the approaching market wide halt.
On Monday, October 27, 1997, the DJIA approached the initial trigger level on two separate
occasions.  At approximately 1:59 PM the DJIA came within 6 index points of the 7366 trigger level that
was eventually breached at 2:36 PM.
18  In order to investigate whether there is a gravitational pull toward
the circuit breaker trigger level, we analyze three half-hour periods, one that was not close to the circuit
breaker trigger (12:59-1:29PM), one that came close to the circuit breaker trigger but did not trigger a halt
(1:29-1:59PM), and one that actually triggered the initial circuit breaker (2:06-2:36PM).  We analyze these
three half-hour periods to control for the possibility that any effects we find are an artifact of a rapidly
declining market and not due to the circuit breaker itself.  Thus, the first period, which was not close to the
circuit breaker trigger, is used to control for the fact that Monday was a high volume day with a large
decline in prices.  The second period, which came very close to the trigger level, but did not breach it, is
used to control for the actual impact of triggering the market wide trading halt.  The third period is used to
examine the actual triggering of the circuit breaker.  Therefore, if the magnet hypothesis holds, we would
                                                     
18 We do not analyze the second trading halt, occurring at 3:36 PM, which was different from the initial halt for two
reasons.  First, it is conditional on the first halt being triggered and second, it had different consequences, namely,
halting trade for the remainder of the day rather than for just 30 minutes.23
expect to find evidence consistent with the magnet effect in the two periods that came close to triggering
the market wide halt but not in first period far from the trigger level.
Table 7 measures aspects of buyside and sellside activity over 10 three-minute intervals for each of
the three periods.  In particular, we measure the number and average size of market sell orders submitted
over the relevant interval as well as the average size of sell limit order submissions and the average size of
buy limit order cancellation rates.  The results of Table 7 show that there are relatively more market sell
orders in the last nine minutes of panels B and C than in panel A.  Four of the largest six counts of the
number of orders occurred in the last nine minutes of those respective panels.  However, a similar sized
count occurred in the first period (1:20-1:23), and the counts from 2:18 to 2:30, just six minutes before the
first circuit breaker was executed, were relatively small for the day.  Although the size of these market sell
orders is often statistically larger than the size of market sell orders within the control period, the size does
not monotonically increase as the end of the period approaches as would be predicted by the magnet effect.
 In fact, panel A displays a similar nine minute interval with statistically increased market sell volume over
a time period (1:08 to 1:17) that is not at all close to the trigger point of the circuit breaker.  Furthermore,
the average size of market sell orders during this period in Panel A is larger than the end of the other two
periods near the circuit breaker.  Thus, the phenomenon of increased average market sell order size is at
least partially a product of an active declining market and not due to the pending activation of the circuit
breaker.
The results on the submission of sell limit orders are not statistically different from the control
sample as the market approaches the trigger value, nor are the three panels noticeably different from each
other.  While we do not see statistically smaller average sell limit orders, the dispersion characteristics
provide evidence that these limit orders are being placed at more aggressive prices effectively creating a
marketable limit order, although again we see these results as well in Panel A.  Thus, despite the fact that
sell limit orders do not diminish in their average size, their placement effectively converts them from limit24
orders to market orders.  Furthermore, this effect again seems more due to the declining day than due to the
circuit breaker.
However, consistent with the magnet effect, there is a concentration of significantly larger buyside
cancellations in panels B and C in the last 9 minutes of each respective period with no corresponding effect
in panel A.  The pattern of buyside cancellations suggests that to some extent, buy limit order traders are
either exiting the market, or at a minimum, repositioning their orders, to account for some perceived
oncoming downward pressure.
While the effects are at least partially driven by increased activity and not by the potential magnet
effect, Panels B and C of Table 7 do present some evidence consistent with a magnet effect toward an
oncoming DJIA trigger level.  The results suggest that although there is an increase in the number of orders
and in the average order size across the three panels, this effect is most pronounced in the last ten minutes
of panels B and C.  In addition, the increased marketability of sell limit orders as well as the heightened
buy limit cancellation rates in the last ten minutes of panels B and C, represent evidence consistent with
the existence of the magnet effect.
B. Liquidity Provision During and After the Circuit Breaker
The other important issue we investigate is how liquidity providers react during and after a market
wide trading halt has been triggered.  At issue is whether or not liquidity providers used the time during the
halt to reenter the market and submit buy limit orders, or whether they used the time to exit the market. 
We measure changes in the quoted spread and depth as well as the limit order book spread, depth and
composition at 2:36, 3:06 and 3:36 PM.  In addition, we measure the flow of orders between these points
in time to gauge how liquidity providers reacted to the halt.
Table 8 provides information on the change in the spread, depth and composition of the limit order
book.  Complementing Table 8 is Chart 5, which displays the cumulative depth on the limit order book25
surrounding the market wide circuit breakers.  At the initiation of the first circuit breaker, none of the
results in Table 8 were significantly different from the control group, although the results at the end of the
first circuit breaker and the initiation of the second circuit breaker are different at the 5% level.  While the
quoted spread dropped from $0.21 to $0.19 and the quoted depth declined a small amount during the half-
hour that the circuit breaker went into effect, the composition of the book remained relatively unchanged. 
The limit order book spread increased from $0.65 to $0.71 over this period.  In addition, cumulative depth
1/8
th and 1/2th away from the best limit order on the sellside dropped by a few thousand shares.  On the
buyside, the cumulative depth 1/8
th away from the best buyside limit order increased, but the depth 1/2th
away decreased slightly.  The lack of change in the cumulative depth is also evident in comparing the first
two panels of Chart 5.
On the buyside of the limit order book, the average number of orders remained constant at the
beginning and end of the circuit breaker, although the total number of shares on the buyside of the limit
order book dropped from 109,138 shares to 107,163 shares.  Buyside limit orders at the end of the circuit
breaker were slightly more dispersed across prices in the limit order book.  While only four of the 100
stocks had no buy limit orders on them at the beginning of the circuit breaker, 15 stocks did not have any
limit orders on the buyside of the limit order book at the end of the circuit breaker.  Similarly, for the
sellside, the average number of orders remained constant, there was a slight drop in the total number of
shares and these shares were slightly more dispersed at the end of the circuit breaker relative to the
beginning.  However, unlike the buyside, no limit order books were empty on the sellside either at the
beginning or at the end of the period.
The results for the half-hour of the circuit breaker are in contrast to the next half-hour, during
which there was active trading and during which the market continued to plunge, ultimately triggering the
circuit breaker a second time.  Panel 3 of Chart 5 shows that by the time the second circuit breaker was
triggered, the limit order book spread had jumped to $0.83, and both the depth at the best prices on the26
limit order book and the cumulative depths had dropped as compared with the beginning of that half-hour
just before trading resumed.
Overall, during the half-hour that the circuit breaker stopped trading, order placement and order
cancellation numbers were significantly below comparable time periods.  Activity seems to have dropped
off precipitously in the absence of trade.  Thus, rather than allow traders time to place buy orders, the
market essentially paused and waited until trading resumed to conduct business.  Unfortunately, we cannot
distinguish this from an alternate scenario in which market participants did not know that they could
submit and cancel orders even though actual trading was halted. 
V. Conclusion
Surprisingly, even though Monday, October 27, 1997 had the largest point drop in history, the
results in this paper indicate that the unusual day – from a liquidity perspective – was Tuesday and not
Monday.  In fact, despite the large drop in prices, liquidity provision for most of the day on Monday was
not statistically different from our control period.  Thus, we find little evidence that the significant drop in
prices on Monday, October 27, 1997 was due to a lack of liquidity provision by the market.
Upon the first execution of a circuit breaker halting the market, liquidity provision and the limit
order books were not significantly different from the limit order books in more normal times.  However,
little liquidity, if any, was provided to the market during the half-hour "cooling off" period.  While there
was some removal of limit orders during this time, the most notable feature of the first circuit breaker
period is the lack of order submission, cancellation or change in the limit order book.  We should note,
however, that we cannot distinguish between the case where market participants knew they could submit or
cancel orders and chose not to, and the observationally equivalent case, where market participants were
unaware that they could continue to submit orders while the circuit breaker was in effect.  In any case, the
fact remains that the NYSE received little order flow (either submissions or cancellations) during this time.27
As such, we do not find any evidence that the execution of the NYSE circuit breaker had beneficial effects
in terms of liquidity provision.
Tuesday, October 28, 1997 saw the most dramatic liquidity drain of the period as liquidity
providers off the floor either withdrew their standing limit orders or changed their trading strategies to
utilize the trading floor.  The aggregate limit order book on Tuesday was uncharacteristically thin and
empty, providing little help to floor members trying to maintain a "fair and orderly" market.   In particular,
limit order spreads – although within normal limits on Monday – widened dramatically on Tuesday.  The
lack of limit orders on the sell side may help explain the record breaking rise in the DJIA on Tuesday, as
there was little or no resistance to rising prices by the limit order book to abate the buying pressure.
Despite the lack of liquidity provision by limit orders on Tuesday, quoted spreads remained in the
normal range.  Most – if not all – of the depth of the quoted spread came from floor participants, and not
from limit orders.  By their actions, floor participants enabled the continuation of a "fair and orderly"
market even in the absence of limit orders.  This result may be due to specialists committing capital to
fulfill their obligations to stabilize the market and maintain price continuity and tight bid-ask spreads. 
Alternatively, off-floor liquidity providers such as large institutions may have strategically switched their
method of liquidity provision from limit orders to using the more flexible (but more expensive) floor
brokers.
While it is admittedly difficult to make inference with only a single observation, the rarity of
extreme market movements makes it impossible to create a sample large enough for statistical significance.
 Despite this drawback, the sharp results of this analysis make compelling arguments for the behavior of
liquidity providers around market breaks.  Furthermore, the results in this paper for a market-wide trading
halt are consistent with the results found for individual stock halts found in Corwin and Lipson (1999). 
Overall, we find that an extreme drop in prices does not significantly affect limit order liquidity provision
while the drop is taking place.  However, after a market closure, particularly prior to the market finding a28
stable trading level, limit order traders withdraw their liquidity provision via limit orders to re-evaluate
their risk.  The provision of liquidity shifts from the limit order book to the floor of the NYSE not during
the market break itself, but the following day.  In addition, the location of the quoted spread relative to the
limit order book spread on Tuesday suggests that the limit order book provided protection against a drop in
prices but no such protection against a rise in prices.   Thus, these results on liquidity provision during
extreme market movements, while they cannot explain the initial drop, may help explain the "bounce back"
phenomenon that is increasingly common to large price decreases.29
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Chronology of Events
October 27, 1997 through October 28, 1997
Date Time Event
October 24, 1997 4:00:00 PM The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) closed at 7,715.
October 27, 1997 9:36:00 AM The DJIA fell 50 points triggering Rule 80A (c), the index arbitrage sell
restrictions.  Under this rule, index arbitrage sells (including short sales and
non-expiring derivative related program strategies) in S&P 500 stocks must be
executed on a plus or zero-plus tick.
11:00:00 AM The nearby S&P 500 futures contract declined 12 points triggering Rule 80A
(a), the five-minute sidecar.  Under the sidecar, all SuperDOT market orders
that are part of a program trade for NYSE-listed S&P 500 stocks are diverted to
a separate blind file.  After the sidecar period ends, buy and sell orders within
this file are paired off and executed.
2:35:55 PM The DJIA declined 350 points from the pervious day’s close triggering Rule
80B, the 350-point circuit breaker, at which time trading was suspended,
market-wide, for 30 minutes.
3:06:00 PM The market re-opened.
3:30:00 PM The DJIA declined 550 points from the previous day’s close triggering Rule
80B, the 550-point circuit breaker, at which time trading was to be suspended
for one hour.  However, given that only 30 minutes of trading remained,
trading was halted for the remainder of the day.  The last value for the DJIA
was 7,161.  The NYSE volume of trade was 684.5 million shares
October 28, 1997 9:30:00 AM The market opened with Rule 80A (a), the sidecar in effect because the nearby
S&P 500 future contract was already down 12 points. 
9:41:00 AM The DJIA declined 50 points triggering Rule 80A (c), the index arbitrage sell
restrictions.
10:06:00 AM The DJIA fell 188 points to 6,973 the lowest point reached throughout the two
days of trading.
10:20:00 AM Rule 80A (c), the index arbitrage sell restrictions were repealed.
10:25:00 AM Rule 80A (c), the index arbitrage buy restrictions were imposed.  The rule
restricts index arbitrage program buys in S&P 500 stocks to be executed on a
minus or a zero-minus tick.
4:00:00 PM DJIA closes at 7,498.  The NYSE volume of trade reached a record 1.2 billion
shares.Table 2
SuperDOT Market Order Flow Characteristics
This table presents data on the market orders submitted for the 100 stocks in our sample for the four days surrounding the market
break of late October 1997 as well as the control periods July 18-23, 1997 and September 12-17, 1997.  The bid-ask spread and the
ask (bid) depth refer to the dollar quoted bid-ask spread and the quoted depth outstanding at the time the market order was submitted.
 Values in bold are significant at the 5% level for both parametric and non-parametric tests.

















A.   Market Break Period
Friday, October 24, 1997
12 – 2 3871 786 0.13 9259 2450 1751 0.13 6061
2 – 4 4141 2625 0.13 8501 3636 5721 0.13 6133
Monday, October 27, 1997
10 – 12 3946 5204 0.13 9574 5519 1508 0.14 7327
12 – 2 3624 2780 0.14 8435 5235 1860 0.14 6285
2:00-2:36 1873 602 0.16 5896 1871 1067 0.16 8728
2:36-3:06 700 353 0.15 17120 640 651 0.16 4843
3:06-3:40 2071 723 0.21 12832 2641 1508 0.21 6368
Tuesday, October 28, 1997
10 – 12 12220 591 0.33 15447 3338 1458 0.30 7294
12 – 2 6338 675 0.16 37800 1927 924 0.15 6242
2 – 4 6088 504 0.15 12704 1450 2711 0.15 6255
Wednesday, October 29, 1997
10 – 12 9084 1219 0.14 11897 5211 1275 0.14 5651
12 – 2 4316 664 0.13 8399 4137 1286 0.13 6348
2 – 4 5170 572 0.13 7288 4692 1491 0.14 5894
B.  Control Periods
Friday
12 – 2 2256 819 0.10 14115 2136 1925 0.11 9589
2 – 4 3769 986 0.11 13895 3202 1555 0.11 9817
Monday 
10 – 12 3122 1283 0.14 8493 3211 941 0.13 9710
12 – 2 1784 1026 0.10 9349 2106 1065 0.10 12573
2:00-2:36 658 1112 0.11 8702 811 2892 0.10 11367
2:36-3:06 627 618 0.11 7852 1706 858 0.11 8686
3:06-3:40 952 700 0.11 8815 1213 1040 0.11 8208
Tuesday
10 – 12 3813 2161 0.12 12880 3266 1927 0.11 9313
12 – 2 2608 1942 0.10 11688 2431 1407 0.10 10134
2 – 4 5410 1380 0.11 11993 3900 940 0.11 10648
Wednesday
10 – 12 3754 950 0.11 19919 3541 2615 0.11 12196
12 – 2 2283 1668 0.10 19947 2354 1317 0.10 11783
2 – 4 3037 2003 0.11 10203 3225 941 0.11 8816Table 3
Limit Order Book Spread and Cumulative Depth
October 27, 1997 through October 28, 1997
This table presents data on the limit order book spread as well as the cumulative depth on the buyside and sellside of the limit order
books of the 100 stocks in our sample for October 27 and 28, 1997.  Limit order books (LOB) were estimated using the technique
described in Kavajecz (1999).  Results are from equally weighted averages of snapshots of the limit order books every 30 minutes.  The
LOB spread is the spread between the best buyside and sellside limit order prices.  Cumulative depth is the sum of all shares available at
a particular price or better on the limit order book.  Cumulative depth is measured from the best limit order price on the limit order book
on that side of the market.  Values in bold are significantly different from the control periods July 18-23, 1997 and September 12-17,













1/8 away 1/4 away 1/2 away
A. Monday, October 27, 1997
Open 2315 6129 7985 13566 1.21 3880 6430 9484 13273
10:30 2790 5811 8539 15566 0.79 2570 8313 13552 19342
11:30 3920 9811 13092 17399 1.05 4153 7392 12168 16827
12:30 3642 8936 12143 16491 0.57 4509 9854 14842 19113
1:30 4604 9668 14103 21202 0.48 3023 6829 11769 18211
2:36 5257 7652 11363 16249 0.65 3501 10417 15120 21745
3:06 5148 7992 11275 14911 0.72 3511 8644 11850 17714
3:36 4422 6490 8962 11375 0.84 2564 5486 8221 14588
B. Tuesday, October 28, 1997
Open 2631 3972 6175 9901 2.12 3805 6488 8128 10819
10:30 3175 4205 5158 8936 2.91 5037 6746 8299 10610
11:30 3678 6054 7698 11379 2.90 5548 7935 9398 15050
12:30 3154 6974 9434 13357 2.93 5304 9481 11093 14577
1:30 5029 7445 9418 13171 2.96 4563 9306 10810 14194
2:30 3227 6428 8870 13217 3.00 4619 8444 10856 14712
3:30 3001 4972 6497 9666 3.13 4673 7452 11667 15634
Close 3218 7026 8837 12762 3.09 6003 10538 16257 20195Table 4
Buyside Limit Order Flow Characteristics
This table presents data on the buyside limit order flow for the 100 stocks in our sample for the four days surrounding
the market event of late October 1997 as well as the control periods July 18-23, 1997 and September 12-17, 1997.  N
represents the number of orders that were placed.  Shares represents the average order size for placed, executed and
cancelled orders respectively.  Dispersion is defined as the average dollar difference between the limit order price of the
placed or cancelled order and the current posted bid price.  Values in bold are significant at the 5% level for both
parametric and non-parametric tests.
Placed Executed Cancelled
N Shares Dispersion Shares Shares Dispersion
A.   Market Event Period
Friday, October 24, 1997
12 – 2 7674 1947 0.13 1996 2046 0.23
2 – 4 8891 2238 0.08 2183 2332 0.12
Monday, October 27, 1997
10 – 12 9634 1915 0.08 1973 1852 0.09
12 – 2 8985 2085 0.25 1804 2454 0.35
2:00-2:36 3315 2337 0.19 1934 2903 0.18
2:37-3:05 720 1321 1.79 1074 2874 4.44
3:06–3:36 2055 2691 0.38 2213 4416 0.46
Tuesday, October 28, 1997
10 – 12 6799 1935 0.74 2276 2477 0.92
12 – 2 4753 1830 0.63 2217 2454 0.33
2 – 4 4857 1891 0.38 1888 2376 0.20
Wednesday, October 29, 1997
10 – 12 9927 1658 0.34 1749 1690 0.22
12 – 2 7642 1556 0.18 1574 1689 0.09
2 – 4 9149 1519 0.17 1581 1585 0.13
B.  Control Periods
Friday
12 – 2 4720 1944 0.13 1747 2187 0.26
2 – 4 7724 2203 0.08 2162 2159 0.17
Monday 
10 – 12 6351 1891 0.08 1913 1891 0.19
12 – 2 3694 1990 0.16 1890 2188 0.29
2:00–2:36 1461 1899 0.14 1788 2173 0.29
2:37-3:05 1388 2006 0.12 1807 2341 0.25
3:06–3:36 2194 2046 0.04 1901 2252 0.13
Tuesday
10 – 12 6557 1723 0.11 1794 1644 0.25
12 – 2 4732 1841 0.12 1923 1809 0.27
2 – 4 9938 1821 0.05 1826 1781 0.15
Wednesday
10 – 12 6618 1894 0.10 2015 1788 0.21
12 – 2 4391 1885 0.12 1830 2053 0.27
2 – 4 6229 2024 0.04 1997 2105 0.12Table 5
Sellside Limit Order Flow Characteristics
This table presents data on the sellside limit order flow for the 100 stocks in our sample for the four days surrounding the
market event of late October 1997 as well as the control periods July 18-23, 1997 and September 12-17, 1997.  N
represents the number of orders that were placed.  Shares represents the average order size for placed, executed and
cancelled orders respectively.  Dispersion is defined as the average dollar difference between the limit order price of the
placed or cancelled order and the current posted ask price.  Values in bold are significant at the 5% level for both
parametric and non-parametric tests.
Placed Executed Cancelled
N Shares Dispersion Shares Shares Dispersion
A.   Market Event Period
Friday, October 24, 1997
12 – 2 5030 2389 0.10 2406 2405 0.12
2 – 4 9214 2204 0.04 2172 2103 0.12
Monday, October 27, 1997
10 – 12 8270 2143 0.03 2246 1998 0.21
12 – 2 9237 2099 0.02 2064 2124 0.17
2:00-2:36 3446 2448 0.03 2379 2452 0.16
2:37-3:05 267 3019 0.56 2202 3146 0.43
3:06–3:36 3801 2225 -0.04 2226 2183 0.23
Tuesday, October 28, 1997
10 – 12 4979 2081 0.04 2255 1855 0.18
12 – 2 3410 1812 0.11 1979 1649 0.15
2 – 4 2952 2604 0.21 2470 2576 0.25
Wednesday, October 29, 1997
10 – 12 10024 2178 0.09 2179 2256 0.22
12 – 2 8628 1959 0.04 2040 1929 0.15
2 – 4 7706 2056 0.05 2043 2143 0.15
B.  Control Periods
Friday
12 – 2 4351 1907 0.10 2044 1820 0.14
2 – 4 6611 2307 0.09 2335 2139 0.14
Monday 
10 – 12 5324 1842 0.12 1845 1868 0.21
12 – 2 3788 1922 0.08 1904 2009 0.10
2:00–2:36 1404 1941 0.08 1966 1985 0.10
2:37-3:05 1546 1976 0.06 1865 2111 0.06
3:06–3:36 2102 1923 0.05 2002 1908 0.10
Tuesday
10 – 12 5640 1923 0.10 1973 1888 0.13
12 – 2 4170 2098 0.10 2031 2225 0.12
2 – 4 7497 2242 0.08 2041 2327 0.09
Wednesday
10 – 12 6558 1969 0.09 2041 1966 0.16
12 – 2 4539 2111 0.08 2029 2312 0.13
2 – 4 6009 2094 0.08 2054 2216 0.15Table 6
Liquidity Provision by Floor Members and the Limit Order Book
October 27, 1997 through October 28, 1997
This table presents data on the percentage of time the floor is contributing depth to the market as well as the average share
contribution to the market depth for the 100 stocks in our sample for October 27 and 28, 1997.  Limit order books (LOB) were
estimated using the technique described in Kavajecz (1999).  Results are from equally weighted averages of snapshots of the limit
order books every 30 minutes.  % Floor Depth displays the percentage of time floor members are supplying at least some of the
depth at the posted quotes.  Floor (LOB) Depth corresponds to the average number of shares provided by floor members (limit
order book) at the posted quotes.  Floor members encompass both the specialists’ own interest as well as the interest of floor
brokers.  Values in bold are significantly different from the control periods July 18-23, 1997 and September 12-17, 1997 at the 5%
level for both parametric and non-parametric tests.
Buyside Sellside
Time % Floor Depth Floor Depth LOB Depth % Floor Depth Floor Depth LOB Depth
A. Monday, October 27, 1997
Open 0.64 844 1509 0.72 1162 2289
10:30 0.44 773 1979 0.57 1712 1238
11:30 0.43 636 2932 0.64 1887 2258
12:30 0.43 777 2690 0.63 2589 2140
1:30 0.34 616 3672 0.61 2299 1646
2:36 0.45 932 4450 0.57 1809 1805
3:06 0.52 1033 4452 0.73 2736 1428
3:36 0.46 605 3678 0.61 1698 1249
B. Tuesday, October 28, 1997
Open 0.52 661 2166 0.87 2792 1548
10:30 0.75 3158 964 0.91 2411 464
11:30 0.76 2881 1194 0.80 1715 827
12:30 0.69 2157 1440 0.84 4481 1230
1:30 0.78 2194 2233 0.81 3153 542
2:30 0.82 1245 499 0.76 2739 898
3:30 0.81 2166 1125 0.80 1787 1104
Close 0.77 2100 1177 0.79 5484 1175Table 7
Order Flow Characteristics approaching the Market-wide Circuit Breaker
This table presents data on the 100 stocks in our sample for three half-hour periods on Monday, October 27, 1997.  The three periods displayed are the two
consecutive half hour periods 12:59 – 1:29PM and 1:29 – 1:59PM as well as the period 2:06 – 2:36PM.  The periods are chosen to coincide with the DJIA
approaching the circuit breaker trigger level of 7366.  The DJIA came within 6 index points at 1:59 PM and actually breached the trigger level at 2:36 PM.  Each
of the three periods is segmented into ten three-minute intervals. Sell placed and buy cancels represents the average order size for placed sell limit orders and
cancelled buy limit orders respectively.  Sell dispersion is defined as the average dollar difference between the limit order price of the placed sell order and the
current posted ask price.  Values in bold are significant at the 5% level for both parametric and non-parametric tests.
Monday, October 27, 1997 Control Periods
Market Sell Orders Limit Orders Market Sell Orders Limit Orders
Change













A.   12:59 – 1:29 PM    (DJIA starts at 7530 and ends at 7458; loss of 72)
12:59-1:02 13 83 18601 1768 0.12 1348 61 1168 1486 0.13 3148
1:02-1:05 -11 101 1283 1937 0.16 2158 47 1089 2505 0.08 1914
1:05-1:08 -12 107 521 1652 0.01 2543 54 658 2035 0.12 2340
1:08-1:11 -27 174 2112 2432 -0.03 3731 53 662 1590 0.05 2440
1:11-1:14 -15 135 1072 2140 -0.01 2245 64 691 1667 0.04 2247
1:14-1:17 -18 178 1855 2048 -0.04 3121 55 813 1935 -0.02 2906
1:17-1:20 -10 189 2000 2456 0.07 2101 53 912 2337 0.19 1678
1:20-1:23 -2 225 2613 2239 -0.01 2994 44 521 2928 0.13 2355
1:23-1:26 -6 149 966 3517 0.04 2472 44 3606 2102 0.08 3553
1:26-1:29 15 126 1130 2380 0.08 2448 51 686 2133 0.10 2145
B.   1:29 – 1:59 PM    (DJIA starts at 7458 and ends at 7372; loss of 86)
1:29-1:32 6 135 2638 2407 -0.01 1928 45 1080 1893 0.02 2826
1:32-1:35 8 124 881 2571 0.07 3023 46 690 2446 -0.20 2654
1:35-1:38 9 94 561 1657 0.04 2773 45 441 1827 0.40 2340
1:38-1:41 -2 103 923 2609 0.01 2696 46 632 1788 -0.01 3413
1:41-1:44 -7 154 3784 2231 0.00 3909 43 706 1505 0.06 2737
1:44-1:47 -3 93 6046 2527 -0.06 2004 77 2375 1553 0.13 2396
1:47-1:50 -7 95 605 2000 0.00 2693 44 601 2561 0.05 2116
1:50-1:53 -35 328 1064 2122 -0.05 4486 47 737 2454 0.09 1790
1:53-1:56 -25 227 961 2256 0.03 3749 73 1100 1886 0.03 3098
1:56-1:59 -30 399 1679 2270 -0.03 4509 53 587 2166 0.11 2822
C.  2:06 – 2:36 PM   (DJIA starts at 7419 and ends at 7361; loss of 58)
2:06-2:09 15 91 1115 2479 0.01 2038 53 558 1747 0.10 1742
2:09-2:12 4 140 780 2424 0.04 2738 66 676 1863 0.03 2190
2:12-2:15 -18 137 956 3132 -0.01 4155 60 617 1708 0.07 4028
2:15-2:18 -24 209 903 2171 -0.02 3684 87 757 1890 0.06 1781
2:18-2:21 -8 123 979 2405 0.04 2844 55 569 1329 0.20 1755
2:21-2:24 15 108 1109 3514 0.00 2257 44 753 1661 0.10 1861
2:24-2:27 3 98 758 2601 0.31 3039 82 497 1880 -0.02 2679
2:27-2:30 -12 111 1532 2327 0.11 3723 50 617 1966 0.08 1536
2:30-2:33 -27 276 1610 2346 -0.04 4697 72 956 1830 0.21 2290
2:33-2:36 -8 216 1079 1939 0.00 3215 56 656 1792 0.03 1640Table 8
Limit Order Books during the Market-wide Circuit Breaker
This table presents data on the 100 stocks in our sample for three points in time surrounding the implementation of the circuit
breakers on Monday, October 27, 1997.  Limit order books (LOB) were estimated using the technique described in Kavajecz
(1999).   The LOB spread is the spread between the best buyside and sellside limit order prices.  Cumulative depth is the sum
of all shares available at a particular price or better on the limit order book.  Cumulative depth is measured from the best limit
order price on the limit order book on that side of the market. Dispersion is defined as the average dollar difference between
the limit order price of the placed or cancelled order and the current posted  bid or ask price.  Empty books are limit order
books in which there were no recorded orders on that side of the book.  The table provides average statistics on the state of
the posted quotes as well as the state of the limit order book. Values in bold are significant at the 5% level for both parametric
and non-parametric tests.
2:36 PM 3:06 PM 3:35 PM
A. Quoted Price Schedule
Spread 0.2144 0.1900 0.2350
Ask Depth 5299 5076 3478
Bid Depth 3608 3711 2766
B. Limit Order Book
LOB Spread 0.6458 0.7145 0.8345
Ask Depth 3501 3511 2564
Sell Cum. Depth 1/8 away 10417 8644 5486
Sell Cum. Depth 1/2 away 21745 17714 14588
Bid Depth 5257 5148 4422
Buy Cum. Depth 1/8 away 7652 7992 6490
Buy Cum. Depth 1/2 away 16249 14911 11375
Buyside
Number of Orders 144 144 126
Total Shares 109138 107163 96269
Dispersion -4.4219 -4.5141 -4.0467
Empty books 4 15 5
Sellside
Number of Orders 118 118 122
Total Shares 164098 163515 175318
Dispersion 3.2143 3.3059 3.5243
Empty books 0 0 0Chart 1
Dow Jones Industrial Average Minute-by-Minute
The chart depicts the Dow Jones Industrial Average minute-by-minute over the two day period, Monday, October, 27, 1997
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Cumulative Limit Order Book Depth at 1:00 PM
The chart depicts the average cumulative limit order book depth for the 100 stocks in our sample.  Limit order books (LOB) were
estimated using the technique described in Kavajecz (1999).  Cumulative depth is the sum of all shares available at a particular
price or better on the limit order book up to $2.00 away.  Cumulative depth is measured from the best limit order price on the
limit order book on that side of the market. The left portion of each chart represents the cumulative buyside limit orders while the
right portion of each chart represents the cumulative sellside limit orders.  The portion of each chart that has zero cumulative
depth represents the average limit order book spread.








































































































Aggregate Cumulative Limit Order Book Depth
The chart depicts the average cumulative limit order book depth for the 100 stocks in our sample each half-hour over the period
Friday, October 24, 1997 at Noon through the close Wednesday, October 29, 1997.  Limit order books (LOB) were estimated
using the technique described in Kavajecz (1999).  Results are from equally weighted averages of snapshots of the limit order
books every 30 minutes.  Cumulative depth is the sum of all shares available at a particular price or better on the limit order book
up to $2.00 away.  Cumulative depth is measured from the best limit order price on the limit order book on that side of the
market. The left (lower) portion represents the cumulative buyside limit orders while the right (upper) portion of the chart




































Quoted Spreads and Limit Order Book Spreads
The chart shows the average quoted spread (dark solid bar) and the average limit order book spread (narrow line) for the 100
stocks in our sample from Noon, Friday, October 24, 1997 through 4:00 PM, Wednesday, October 29, 1997.  Limit order books
(LOB) were estimated using the technique described in Kavajecz (1999).   Results are from equally weighted averages of
snapshots of the limit order books every 30 minutes. The LOB spread is the spread between the best buyside and sellside limit





































Cumulative Limit Order Book Depth Surrounding the Market Wide Trading Halts
The chart depicts the average cumulative limit order book depth for the 100 stocks in our sample.  Limit order books (LOB) were
estimated using the technique described in Kavajecz (1999). Cumulative depth is the sum of all shares available at a particular
price or better on the limit order book up to $2.00 away.  Cumulative depth is measured from the best limit order price on the
limit order book on that side of the market. The left portion of each chart represents the cumulative buyside limit orders while the
right portion of each chart represents the cumulative sellside limit orders.  The portion of each chart that has zero cumulative
depth represents the average limit order book spread.
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